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Blurred Lines: How to Rationally
Understand the “Rational
Understanding” Doctrine After
Madison v. Alabama
Abstract
In Madison v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a capital inmate’s
inability to remember his crime did not render him incompetent to be
executed. The Court reasoned that an individual who suffers from episodic
memory loss may still “rationally understand” society’s reasons for
sentencing him to death for a crime he once committed. This Note explores
the impact of memory loss on a person’s self-identity, and consequently
challenges the notion that a capital inmate who no longer remembers his
crime can truly have a rational understanding of it. Specifically, this Note
examines how memory loss substantially weakens the two main justifications
the Court supplies for capital punishment. First, execution of a defendant
who no longer remembers his crime offers society less retribution because
the person being punished lacks psychological continuity with the person
who committed the crime. Second, this change in identity calls into question
the morality of execution in these circumstances because such a punishment
may not be proportional to the crime committed. Ultimately, this Note
proposes that the Court adopt a categorical ban on capital punishment for
those who cannot remember their crime, which will alleviate the burden
placed on mental health professionals to determine whether an inmate can
“rationally understand” his crime.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a person with vascular dementia who, day after day, becomes
increasingly confused about his surroundings.1 This person has trouble
performing everyday tasks such as getting dressed, brushing his teeth, or
walking by himself.2 He cannot recite the alphabet, count by threes, or
rephrase simple sentences.3 He is reported to have a “very substantial deficit
in regard to working memory” and, due to the absence of effective
treatments for regions of the brain damaged by a lack of blood flow, “there
is little hope of stopping the disease or its progression.”4 But this person has
also lived on death row for the past thirty years, and now his execution is
imminent.5 Even though this person’s cognitive abilities have “sharply
deteriorated,” when asked if he understands that the State wishes to execute
him as punishment for crimes he committed in 1985, he answers in the
affirmative.6 Yet, this defendant has no memory of committing the crimes
that are described to him.7
According to the recent holding of Madison v. Alabama, the Eighth
Amendment does not protect this defendant from execution.8 Because he
can understand that he once committed a crime, and that the State seeks
retribution by executing him for committing that crime, this defendant is
deemed competent to be executed.9
In 1986, Ford v. Wainwright laid the groundwork for claims involving
competency to be executed.10 Between 1986 and 2012, 5,724 individuals

1. Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n and American Psychiatric Ass’n as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 9, Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019) (No. 17-7505).
2. Id. at 9–10.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id. at 9–10 (quoting ECF No. 8-3 at 17, Madison v. Dunn, No. CV 16-00191-KD-M, 2016
2732193 (S.D. Ala. May 10, 2016)).
5. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 723.
6. Id. at 723–24.
7. Id. at 723.
8. Id. at 731 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment may permit executing Madison even if he cannot
remember committing his crime.”).
9. Id. at 731 (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007)) (“The sole question on
which Madison’s competency depends is whether he can reach a ‘rational understanding’ of why the
State wants to execute him.”).
10. 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (“It is no less abhorrent today than it has been for centuries to exact
in penance the life of one whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the
penalty or its implications.”).
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were sentenced to death.11 However, only 141 of those individuals filed
Ford claims, arguing that mental illness prevented them from understanding
the reasons for their executions.12 Only 21 of these claims were successful.13
The scarcity of Ford claims is likely due to the vague language that the
Supreme Court has used to define competency, which makes it difficult for
attorneys to argue and prove incompetency on a case-by-case basis.14 The
Supreme Court has framed the standard for a defendant’s competency to be
executed as one of “rational understanding”—in other words, a defendant is
competent to be executed if he can rationally understand the reason for his
execution.15 Through Madison, the Court has made this competency
standard even more elusive in application by holding that even defendants
who have no memory of committing their crimes may still be considered
competent to be executed.16
While capital cases comprise a relatively small percentage of the
criminal docket for most states,17 the gravity of their outcomes makes it
11. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Katherine E. Ensler, Killing the Oblivious: An
Empirical Study of Competency to be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 335, 344 (2014).
12. Id. at 344. Of the individuals who brought Ford claims during this time, over half had
brought competency challenges earlier in the litigation. Id. at 349. What’s more, nearly a quarter of
them “had previously been found incompetent to stand trial or proceed” in their cases. Id. Of
course, this also means that those defendants were later found competent once again. Id. at 349 n.69.
However, this statistic works to refute the claim that Ford would result in a flurry of frivolous
incompetency claims. Id. at 352 (“[T]he Rehnquist/Burger fear of frivolous competency to be
executed litigation has not materialized.”).
13. Id. at 344.
14. Id. at 355 (“Despite its vague contours, the Ford/Panetti standard is stringent in theory and
very difficult to satisfy in practice.”); see also Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a
“Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 285, 288 (2007) (“Scott Panetti’s case raised questions about both [the substantive and
procedural standards of claiming incompetence], but the Court’s opinion is notable for how little it
manages to say in answering them.”).
15. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007).
16. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 727 (2019). Prior to Madison, some scholars
seemed to believe the concepts of memory and rational understanding were intertwined. See, e.g.,
Bruce Ebert, Competency to be Executed: A Proposed Instrument to Evaluate an Inmate’s Level of
Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the Execution of the Presently
Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 41 (2001) (“If a prisoner cannot remember or retain the
reason for this punishment, or even the fact that he is going to be executed, then, clearly, he should
be found incompetent for the purposes of execution.”).
17. See Gallup Poll—For First Time, Majority of Americans Prefer Life Sentence To Capital
Punishment, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (NOV. 25, 2019) https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/
gallup-poll-for-first-time-majority-of-americans-prefer-life-sentence-to-capital-punishment.
This
percentage continues to decline, as death sentences have decreased by fifty percent since 2010. Id.
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imperative that the judiciary correctly define the standard for competency.18
This Note explores the holding of Madison v. Alabama and argues that the
Court applied the “rational understanding” standard for competency to be
executed too narrowly by deciding that memory loss alone has no effect on
competency.19 Part II provides a brief overview of the death penalty’s
reinstatement and the constitutional restrictions the Supreme Court has
upheld for the execution of certain groups over time; it also addresses the
key cases dealing with the effect of mental illness on competency to be
executed.20 Part III discusses the facts of Madison and the Court’s reasoning
in concluding that memory loss does not automatically preclude capital
punishment unless it affects a defendant’s rational understanding of his
crime and punishment.21 Part IV.A argues that the Court’s holding is
inconsistent with the retributive value of capital punishment because an
individual who loses his memory of a crime also loses his psychological
connection to the crime and undergoes a change in identity.22 Part IV.B then
asserts that no retributive value can be gained from punishing a different
identity, and consequently, the punishment is disproportionate to the
offense.23 Part V discusses the implications of Madison’s outcome,
addresses concerns that this case even further disguises the true meaning of
“rational understanding,” and proposes a categorical prohibition against
executing a defendant who cannot remember his crime.24 Finally, Part VI
concludes that memory of the crime is a quintessential element for a
defendant to have a rational understanding of the reasons for his execution.25
18. See John L. Farringer IV, The Competency Conundrum: Problems Courts Have Faced in
Applying Different Standards for Competency to be Executed, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2441, 2493 (2001)
(“Time should be spent to ensure that the rule against executing the insane is being applied properly
in actual cases. State legislatures and the Supreme Court owe such an effort not just to prisoners
facing death, but to a society yearning for a restored conscience.”). Others have used even more
extreme language to describe the need for more precise standards for execution. See, e.g., Linda
Malone, Too Ill to Be Killed: Mental and Physical Competency to Be Executed Pursuant to the
Death Penalty, 51 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 167 (2018) (“[The death penalty’s] reinstatement in
Gregg v. Georgia is a failed experiment with human life that has devolved into human
experimentation in methods of execution of often feeble and otherwise impaired prisoners.”).
19. See infra Parts IV, V.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Section IV.A.
23. See infra Section IV.B.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VI.
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II. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE COURTROOM
A. The Death Penalty’s American Beginning and States’ Discretion
The practice of capital punishment in America is as old as the country
itself.26 Support for capital punishment and a perceived need for the
institution is deep-rooted in America; however, equally deep-rooted is the
criticism of the practice and the struggle for states to define its scope in light
of the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment.27
Before 1976, states had complete discretion in molding the boundaries of
capital punishment, and in turn, states left this issue largely in the hands of
juries to determine whether a defendant’s conduct warranted capital
punishment.28 The Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia put a
stop to states’ discretion in imposing capital punishment and deemed the
current state of the death penalty unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment due to states’ arbitrary application of the punishment.29 States
26. See Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 811, 813–15 (1995) (explaining that America “inherited” England’s capital punishment regime
and retained many of its intricacies).
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Fletcher, supra note 26, at 814–15 (“Since colonial
times, there have been sporadic efforts to abolish the death penalty in the United States, and many
individual states have repealed capital statutes.”).
28. See Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 4 (1972) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971)) (“Justice Harlan [in a
pre-1976 opinion] was convincing in arguing that juries should take the punishment decision under
submission without standards to guide the determination: it should be done this way because it must
be done this way. Experience has shown that it is all but impossible ‘to identify before the fact those
homicides for which the slayer should die.’”). This allowance of state discretion reveals a recurring
theme throughout this Note: courts’ avoidance of bright line rules and use of vague terms in death
penalty jurisprudence is likely due to the difficulty in evaluating what characteristics make a human
life fit for death as a matter of law. See, e.g., id. at 26 (explaining that the Justices may have
contradicted themselves in two Supreme Court rulings on the death penalty because “with twentyfive score human lives in their hands, they were unable to appreciate the virtues of consistency”).
29. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Three defendants were sentenced to death, two
under Georgia’s state procedures and the other under Texas’s. Id. at 239. The majority held that the
imposition of the death penalty in these cases would violate the Eighth Amendment, with each
Justice providing different reasoning for this conclusion through individual concurring opinions. Id.
at 239–40. In sum, the concurring Justices took issue with the complete discretion states had
previously possessed in imposing the death penalty, such as Justice Brennan, who believed “[i]t is a
denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually severe
punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as acceptable.” Id. at 286 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Chief Justice Burger, however, feared the majority’s approach stepped into the role of
the legislative body, and he emphasized that “it is essential to our role as a court that we not seize
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then struggled to refine their death penalty statutes to comply with the
Eighth Amendment, and in turn, to evaluate what factual scenarios could
legally justify execution of defendants.30 The Court did not see another
death penalty case for another four years—the only four years in American
history where no federally permissible means of execution existed.31
B. Reaffirmation of the Death Penalty
The Supreme Court reversed course in Gregg v. Georgia, where it
addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole and, holding
that capital punishment did “not invariably violate the Constitution,”
attempted to clarify the proper role for capital punishment in light of the
Eighth Amendment’s mandate against the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment.32 The Court began by exploring the case law that had guided
interpretations of the Eighth Amendment “in a flexible and dynamic
manner,” and concluded that at the very least, the Eighth Amendment
required “that the punishment not be ‘excessive.’”33 The Court determined
that two requirements must be met to successfully avoid excessive
punishment: 1) “the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,” and 2) “the punishment must not be grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime.”34 As long as these two tests were
satisfied, the judiciary’s role in the imposition of the punishment was
complete, and deference should be extended to the legislature as the
representative of the people.35
upon the enigmatic character of the guarantee as an invitation to enact our personal predilections into
law.” Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
30. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 373 (1999) (“The immediate response to
Furman was a short-lived movement toward statutes that eliminated all jury discretion by mandating
imposition of a death penalty upon establishment of certain predicate facts.”).
31. See Thomas Adcock, A History of the Death Penalty in America, 36 CORNELL L.F. 6, 6
(2010).
32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
33. Id. at 171–73.
34. Id. at 173.
35. Id. at 175 (“We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so
long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.”). But
see Hugo Adam Bedau, Gregg v. Georgia and the “New” Death Penalty, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 6
(1985) (“Judicial intervention here does not entail judicial meddling with every other legislative
choice in the penal code. The question was never one of requiring states to impose the ‘least severe
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The Court then looked to common law tradition and the contemporary
views of American citizens for support of the death penalty, noting in
particular that thirty-five states had attempted to rework their death penalty
statutes to maintain their constitutionality in response to the Furman
holding.36 The Court also relied on the retributive value of capital
punishment, arguing that the instinct to seek retribution is a part of human
nature, and it is the government’s duty to provide its people with access to
retribution.37 The Court concluded that despite the death penalty’s
uniqueness “in its severity and irrevocability,” the Court was required to
hold, “in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of
[death] as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is
not unconstitutionally severe.”38
C. Judicial Limitations on Who Is “Fit” for Capital Punishment
Even in light of its reaffirmation of the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has established that the Eighth Amendment’s meaning is not static and
should instead adapt to society’s changing moral values.39 Accordingly, the
Court has limited the application of the death penalty since Gregg,
reexamining society’s view on the morality and retributive value of the death
penalty under various circumstances.40
The Court in Coker v. Georgia emphasized the importance of looking to
state laws when evaluating the public’s view of what is morally acceptable.41
In Coker, the defendant was sentenced to death for raping a woman after
escaping a correctional facility where he was serving sentences for other
crimes.42 The Court determined that “[a]t no time in the last 50 years have a
penalty’; it was always only that of requiring them to impose the alternative, very severe penalty of
long-term imprisonment . . . .”).
36. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176–80.
37. Id. at 183 (“This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered
society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their
wrongs.”).
38. Id. at 187.
39. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
40. See infra notes 41–55 and accompanying text.
41. 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (looking to state laws in order to “seek guidance . . . from the
objective evidence of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a
penalty for rape of an adult woman”).
42. Id. at 587.
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majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for rape,” and the
overall judgment of state legislatures “weigh[ed] very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult
woman.”43 The Court concluded that while the crime of rape is
“reprehensible . . . it does not compare with murder, which does involve the
unjustified taking of human life.”44 It emphasized that a punishment of
death is disproportionate to a crime that does not involve death, even if the
defendant has had prior convictions for murder.45
The Court applied similar reasoning in Enmund v. Florida to a prisoner
who was convicted for acting as an accomplice to felony murder.46 Again
looking to state law to gauge the public’s opinion, the Court concluded that
“only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant
who somehow participated in a robbery where a murder occurred to be
sentenced to die.”47 Thus, it held that execution was an excessive penalty
for one “who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing
take place or that lethal force will be employed,” and therefore does not
cause “an affront to humanity.”48 Turning to the retributive value of
executing an accomplice of felony murder, the Court emphasized that the
focus must be on the accomplice’s individual culpability, meaning it must
analyze the “relevant facets of the character and record of the individual
offender.”49 The Court concluded that no retributive end is served by
executing an individual who does not share the “personal responsibility and
moral guilt” of the actual murderer.50
Most recently, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth
Amendment does not allow for the execution of juvenile offenders under
eighteen years of age.51 The Court again determined that objective factors

43. Id. at 593, 596.
44. Id. at 597–98.
45. Id. at 599.
46. 458 U.S. 782, 788–89 (1982) (noting the objective approach of the Coker Court and
endeavoring “to analyze the punishment at issue in this case in a similar manner”).
47. Id. at 792.
48. Id. at 797.
49. Id. at 798 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
50. Id. at 801 (holding that execution of an individual who did not intend to commit murder
“does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just
deserts”).
51. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).

505

[Vol. 48: 497, 2021]

Blurred Lines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

weigh against execution of this category of individuals.52 It found that
youths do not have the same level of culpability as adults because youths are
more susceptible “to immature and irresponsible behavior,” and thus a crime
committed by a minor is not necessarily “evidence of irretrievably depraved
character.”53 The Court reasoned that “the case for retribution is not as
strong with a minor as with an adult” because “[o]nce the diminished
culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological
justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to
adults.”54 Thus, the Court concluded that execution of juvenile offenders is
unconstitutional.55
These cases reflect a pattern of two core values that the Court upholds
when considering how the Eighth Amendment restricts capital punishment.56
First, the continued culpability of the defendant is essential to serve the
death penalty’s retributive values, which means that the Court must
singularly focus on the character and identity of the capital defendant.57
Second, capital punishment is justified only where the crime that was
committed is equal to the punishment in both severity and permanence.58
Defendants who lose their memory of the crime they committed
52. Id. at 567 (“[T]he objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile
death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the
books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—provide sufficient evidence
that today our society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002))).
53. Id. at 570; see also id. (“From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies
will be reformed.”).
54. Id. at 571. The Court also expressed concern that the diminished culpability of a juvenile
defendant might be overlooked by a jury where the details of a brutal or heinous crime were also
presented, even though the defendant’s immaturity or vulnerability should properly call for a lesser
sentence. Id. at 572–73. It emphasized the difficulty that even expert psychiatrists face in
distinguishing “between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Id. at 573.
The Court concluded that “[i]f trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing” hesitate to
make such a distinction, “States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver
condemnation—that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.” Id.
55. Id. at 571.
56. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
57. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
58. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187
(1976)) (“We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and
irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.”);
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.

506

[Vol. 48: 497, 2021]

Blurred Lines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

undergo a change in identity as a result, which lessens their degree of
culpability.59 Consequently, the retributive value of executing this class of
individuals is questionable, and therefore the severity of the punishment is
likely disproportionate to the crime.60 The Supreme Court’s “rational
understanding” standard for capital punishment involving mentally ill
defendants, however, has allowed this class of individuals to slip through its
cracks.61
D. The Rise of the “Rational Understanding” Doctrine for Mentally Ill
Capital Prisoners
Changing societal values have led the Court to recognize another
limitation on capital punishment.62 The Court has limited the execution of
“mentally incompetent” prisoners by analyzing the same rationales as cases
involving other classes of prisoners—morality and retributive value.63
Perhaps the most influential case to address the use of the death penalty on
the mentally incompetent was Ford v. Wainwright, where the Court
conclusively held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an
insane prisoner.64 The Court again considered “objective evidence of
contemporary values” but began its analysis by considering common law
justifications for barring execution of the insane.65 Notably, the Court
quoted Blackstone for the proposition that “if, after judgment, [a man]
becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure,
says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound
59. For a more in-depth explanation of why this is the case, see infra Section IV.A.
60. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“When the choice is between life and death,
th[e] risk [that a court might impose a disproportionate sentence] is unacceptable and incompatible
with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
61. See generally Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2019) (“But delusions come in
many shapes and sizes, and not all will interfere with the understanding that the Eighth Amendment
requires.”).
62. See infra notes 63–84 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text.
64. 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986). Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
1974. Id. at 401. It was undisputed that Ford was competent at the time of his crime, at trial, and
sentencing. Id. In 1982, however, Ford’s personality began to change, and he began to suffer from
severe delusions. Id. at 402. Three psychiatrists evaluated Ford’s competency and all three came to
different conclusions as to the extent to which he could understand his current situation, but the
Governor of Florida nevertheless signed Ford’s death warrant without explanation. Id. at 403–04.
65. Id. at 406–08.
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memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or
execution.”66 This proposition became the foundation of the common law
analysis of capital punishment for mentally ill defendants.67
The Court observed that with respect to the common law prohibition of
putting the insane to death, “the reasons for the rule are less sure and less
uniform than the rule itself.”68 This is because scholars have developed
various explanations over time: some have argued that execution of the
insane “simply offends humanity,” while others have noted the lack of
deterrent value in executing insane criminals because “it provides no
example to others.”69 More recently, scholars have expressed doubt “that
the community’s quest for ‘retribution’” is served by executing the mentally
incompetent.70 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that “[w]hether its aim be
to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of
understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of
exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth
Amendment.”71
The Court further clarified what it means to be “mentally competent” in
Panetti v. Quarterman, recognizing that Ford “did not set forth a precise
standard for competency.”72 In Panetti, the defendant had been prescribed
medication for his mental disorders that “would be difficult for a person not
suffering from extreme psychosis even to tolerate,” and during trial, the
defendant engaged in “‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and ‘trance-like’” behavior.73
There was evidence that the defendant stopped taking his medication prior to
trial, and “the state trial court found him incompetent to waive the

66. Id. at 406–07 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24–25).
67. See id. at 408–09 (“It is clear that the ancient and humane limitation upon the State’s ability
to execute its sentences has as firm a hold upon the jurisprudence of today as it had centuries ago in
England.”).
68. Id. at 407.
69. Id. at 407–08 (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).
70. Id. at 408; see also Joan P. Cafone, Execution of the Insane, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 433,
436 (1988) (“[A]lthough many explanations have been offered, there is no general agreement as to
why there should be a rule proscribing the execution of mentally incompetent capital inmates.
Indeed, some commentators observe that the uneasiness over invoking the insanity exemption may
represent deeper public misgivings about the death penalty itself.”).
71. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
72. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957 (2007). The defendant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death in 1995. Id. at 937.
73. Id. at 936.
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appointment of state habeas counsel.”74 Expert testimony further revealed
that the defendant believed the state’s express reason for executing him was
a “sham,” and the state truly wished to execute him to “stop him from
preaching.”75 Nevertheless, the district court found that the defendant was
competent to be executed.76 The circuit court affirmed, relying on three
findings: 1) the defendant was “aware that he committed the murders,” 2)
the defendant was “aware that he [would] be executed,” and 3) the defendant
was “aware that the reason the State ha[d] given for the execution [was] his
commission of the crimes in question.”77
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that
the standard set forth in the lower courts was “too restrictive to afford a
prisoner the protections granted by the Eighth Amendment.”78 Considering
the retributive justification for the death penalty, the Court stated “that
capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the
offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime” and affirms society’s
judgment that the defendant’s culpability is so severe “that the ultimate
penalty must be sought and imposed.”79 The Court reasoned that “[t]he
potential for a prisoner’s recognition of the severity of the offense and the
objective of community vindication” is inhibited when a defendant’s mental
condition causes an inability to connect “his awareness of the crime and
punishment” to “the understanding of those concepts shared by the
community as a whole.”80
Thus, the Court concluded that while Ford did not construct a precise
definition for “mental incompetency,” the general principles that the Court’s
holding alluded to were not served by the state’s law that emphasized a
defendant’s understanding of the expressed reason for the execution rather
than the defendant’s subjective belief about why the execution is taking
74. Id. at 936–37.
75. Id. at 954–55.
76. Id. at 956.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 956–57, 962.
79. Id. at 958; see also Gerald H. Gottlieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 268,
274 (1961) (“The ethics of republican government lead us to the conclusion that punishment shall
not be meted which inflicts pain or loss without necessity.”); see also Cafone, supra note 70, at 461
(“Capital punishment, as the most severe and irremediable form of punishment imposed, is intended
to be utilized only where serious offenses have been committed and where few mitigating factors are
present.”).
80. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958–59.
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place.81 Further, the Court emphasized that “[a] prisoner’s awareness of the
State’s rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding
of it.”82
However, the Court noted “that a concept like rational
understanding is difficult to define,” and it refrained from attempting “to set
down a rule governing all competency determinations.”83 Thus, the rational
understanding standard left the meaning of competency to be executed as
ambiguous as before.84
III. MADISON’S CASE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND MEMORY LOSS
Unsurprisingly, this ambiguity resurfaced in Madison v. Alabama.85
Vernon Madison was sentenced to death in 1985 for killing a police
officer,86 and he has spent the remainder of his life since then on death row.87
After suffering from major strokes in 2015 and 2016, Madison was
diagnosed with vascular dementia, and consequently was unable to
remember “committing the crime for which he [had] been sentenced to
die.”88 Consequently, Madison petitioned “for a stay of his execution on the
ground that he” was no longer mentally competent, “argu[ing] that ‘he no
longer underst[ood]’ the ‘status of his case’ or the ‘nature of his conviction
and sentence.’”89 The State rebutted, arguing that regardless of what
Madison remembered, he satisfied the Ford and Panetti standards for
81. Id. at 959.
82. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 960 (“Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental
disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far
removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.”).
83. Id. at 959–61.
84. See Steiker, supra note 14, at 300 (concluding that “Panetti brings us no closer” to a genuine
understanding of what constitutes competency to be executed, but rather “it illuminates some of the
difficulties that await”).
85. 139 S. Ct. 718, 726–27 (2019).
86. Id. at 723. This Note, along with the case itself, accepts as true that Madison was guilty and
deserving of capital punishment at the time he initially committed the crime and was initially
convicted. See id. at 723. However, this Note proceeds under the notion that the extent of a
defendant’s culpability can change over time depending on the circumstances that a defendant is
confronted with. See Christopher Birch, Memory and Punishment, 19 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 17, 29
(2000) (“[T]he offender’s deserving punishment is not something determined once and for all
immediately after the commission of a crime, but it is something that must be sustained until the
punishment has been completed.”).
87. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 723.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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competency because he could rationally understand the reason for his
execution sentence.90
Both Madison and the State introduced expert testimony to support their
arguments regarding Madison’s mental competency.91 Madison’s expert
reported “that although Madison ‘underst[ood] the nature of execution’ in
the abstract, he did not comprehend the ‘reasoning behind’ Alabama’s effort
to execute him.’”92 Conversely, the State’s expert found that Madison did
not appear to be delusional, and therefore, he could comprehend his legal
situation.93 The trial court ultimately found Madison competent to be
executed in light of the State’s expert testimony, holding that Madison
appeared to have a rational understanding of his punishment and why he
would suffer it, and did not appear delusional.94 After seeking habeas
review in federal court, the Eleventh Circuit held that Madison had shown
indisputable error in the state court’s ruling.95 The Supreme Court reversed
the circuit court, however, and held that the trial court did not clearly err in
concluding that Madison was competent to be executed.96
After the state set an execution date, Madison returned to state court and
again argued that his mental state prohibited his execution.97 The state court,
citing Ford and Panetti, again found Madison competent for execution, and
the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari for direct review of the
state court’s decision.98 The Court presented three issues for review: 1)
“whether Panetti prohibits executing Madison merely because he cannot
remember committing his crime,”99 2) “whether Panetti[ ]permits executing
90. Id. at 723–24.
91. Id. at 724.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 724–25.
95. Id. at 725.
96. Id. (citing Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2017)). Because habeas petitions are subject to
the deferential standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the
Court emphasized that its holding was limited to this deferential context. Id. The Court declined to
make any determination of Madison’s competency under a non-deferential standard. Id.
97. Id. While Madison reiterated the same facts and arguments that he had previously made to
the state court, he additionally argued that his mental state had worsened, and asserted that the
State’s expert from the original trial had since lost his license to practice psychology. Id.
98. Id. at 726. Because the Court was now directly reviewing the state court’s decision, the
deferential AEDPA standard no longer applied. Id.
99. Id. The Court stated that Madison conceded this point at oral argument, where he agreed
with Chief Justice Roberts that “simply blacking out” without any evidence of a mental disorder is
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Madison merely because he suffers from dementia, rather than psychotic
delusions,”100 and 3) whether, applying the answers to these questions to
Madison’s case, his execution could proceed.101
Addressing the first issue, the Court held that someone who has genuine
memory loss but “remains oriented in time and place” and “comprehends
familiar concepts of crime and punishment” may still satisfy the standard for
mental competency under Ford and Panetti.102 The Court reasoned that
Panetti emphasizes “understanding, not memory” and concluded that “one
may exist without the other.”103 The Court analogized remembering one’s
crime to remembering the Civil War or one’s first day of school to clarify
the distinction: while an “independent recollection” may not exist in either
case, it is still possible to understand that those events occurred.104 Thus, the
Court held that a defendant who does not remember his crime may still be
insufficient to satisfy the Ford standard of incompetency. Id. (“But at this Court, Madison accepted
Alabama’s position on the first issue.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Madison, 139 S. Ct. 718
(No. 17-7505). However, Madison’s counsel quickly clarified that this concession was rooted in the
evidentiary difficulties associated with proving memory loss. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 12
(“[W]e recognize that it’s too easy for any offender to say ‘I don’t remember.’ Defendants at trial
often use defenses of ‘I don’t remember.’ It doesn’t preclude the state from trying them, from
convicting them, from sentencing them.”). For further discussion of the distinction between true
memory loss and mere claims of memory loss that are never brought to bear, see infra notes 229–
232 and accompanying text.
100. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 726. The Court also noted that the State conceded this point at oral
argument. Id. During the argument, counsel for the State admitted that “if someone has vascular
dementia or any other mental illness, if it precludes them from having a rational understanding of
their punishment, and that they will die when they’re executed, they would meet the Ford [sic] and
Panetti [sic] standard.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 36.
101. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 729. The dissent argued that the Court should not have heard this case
at all, because the petition for certiorari only addressed the first two issues that the parties conceded.
Id. at 731–38 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito stated that “there [was] no inkling” in the petition
of the argument that the state court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of the law, and he
suggested “that the real reason for [the] decision [was] doubt on the part of the majority regarding
the correctness of the state court’s factual finding.” Id. at 734, 738 (Alito, J., dissenting). However,
the majority rejected this reasoning, presumably on the ground that resolution of the issues in the
petition necessarily involved review of the state court’s competency analysis and, because of the
change in the standard of review now that AEDPA no longer applied, the Court’s “decision on
Madison’s habeas petition [could not] help resolve the questions raised here.” Id. at 726.
102. Id. at 727.
103. Id.
104. Id. (“Do you have an independent recollection of the Civil War? Obviously not. But you
may still be able to reach a rational—indeed, a sophisticated—understanding of that conflict and its
consequences. Do you recall your first day of school? Probably not. But if your mother told you
years later that you were sent home for hitting a classmate, you would have no trouble grasping the
story.”).
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competent to be executed if he nevertheless understands why he is to be
punished.105
The Court justified its reasoning by finding that its conclusion was
consistent with the framing Panetti set out in its Eighth Amendment inquiry,
which concerned the retributive and moral values involved in execution.106
Panetti found that retributive value stems from appreciation of “the meaning
of a community’s judgment,” and here the Court found that “a person who
can no longer remember a crime may yet recognize the retributive message
society intends to convey with a death sentence.”107 Likewise, while the
Ford and Panetti Courts concluded that it “‘offends humanity’ to execute a
person so wracked by mental illness that he cannot comprehend the
‘meaning and purpose of the punishment,’” this Court found that the
“offense to morality must be much less when a person’s mental disorder
causes nothing more than an episodic memory loss.”108 Thus, the Court
concluded that retribution is still served and moral values are not upended by
executing a defendant who cannot remember his crime.109
Addressing the second issue, the Court held that while memory loss
alone is insufficient to satisfy the Panetti standard, psychotic delusions are
not necessary to qualify an individual as mentally incompetent.110 The Court
reasoned that the standard concerns a lack of rational understanding of the
community’s judgment, regardless of the cause of such a condition.111
Moreover, the Court determined that the justifications set forth in Ford and
Panetti supported this conclusion because those justifications were also
concerned with the effect of incomprehension rather than its cause.112 The
Court suggested that dementia would implicate Eighth Amendment concerns
if, for example, a person was incapable of retaining any memories such that
“even newly gained knowledge” was “quickly forgotten,” or if “cognitive
deficits prevent the acquisition of such knowledge at all, so that memory

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958–59 (2007)).
108. Id. (“Moral values do not exempt the simply forgetful from punishment, whatever the
neurological reason for their lack of recall.”).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 728.
111. Id. (“Psychosis or dementia, delusions or overall cognitive decline are all the same under
Panetti, so long as they produce the requisite lack of comprehension.”).
112. Id. at 729 (“[I]f and when [a] failure of understanding is present, the rationales kick in . . . .”).
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gaps go forever uncompensated.”113
Turning to the third issue—the mental competency of Madison
himself—the Court held that remand was necessary because it was unclear
whether the state court had found him competent under the erroneous
assumption that only delusional states satisfied the Panetti standard.114 The
Court held that while the original decision evaluating Madison’s competency
stated that Madison had a rational understanding of his sentence, the more
recent evaluation that the Court was reviewing did not incorporate that
language.115 Further, the original decision emphasized Madison’s lack of
delusions without discussing his dementia.116 Thus, the Court remanded the
case to the state court and, because much of the original expert testimony
and reporting relied on erroneous interpretations of the law, instructed the
court to supplement the record as necessary.117
IV. THE RETRIBUTIVE AND MORAL VALUE OF EXECUTING THOSE WHO
DON’T REMEMBER
The Court’s reading of the rational understanding requirement
unnecessarily narrows the application of the Panetti standard.118 Rational
understanding of the community’s reason for its judgment is undoubtedly a
key requirement under the Eighth Amendment.119 However, rational
understanding is not as restrictive of a standard as it might appear,
particularly when comparing understanding of one’s crimes to understanding
the Civil War.120 In order to evaluate the constitutionality of executing
113. Id. at 727–28.
114. Id. at 729–31.
115. Id. at 730.
116. Id. at 730–31.
117. Id. at 731 (emphasizing that the state court must ensure “that if [Madison] is to be executed,
he understands why”).
118. See infra Parts IV, V.
119. See J. D. Feltham, The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4. MELB. U.L.
REV. 434, 468 (1964) (“[P]erhaps the most convincing purpose for which the rule [against execution
of the insane] has been said to exist in modern circumstances is that punishment should not be
inflicted upon a person incapable of comprehending the reason why he is punished.”).
120. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007) (“[A] concept like rational
understanding is difficult to define.”); Jules L. Coleman, Rational Choice and Rational Cognition, 3
LEG. 183, 198 (1997) (“Davidsonian considerations do not appear to establish psychological
rationality—that is, the very different claim that agents are rational. Rational-choice theory (and
rationalistic theories generally) require the psychological, not the epistemological, sense of
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criminals who do not remember their crimes, a further inquiry into the two
justifications provided in Madison is necessary—retributive value and moral
offense.121 Due to the identity shift and psychological disconnect that
memory loss causes, the execution of defendants who cannot remember their
crimes does not satisfy retributive values and consequently is an excessive
punishment.122
A. Retributive Value: Memory Loss and Punishment
In considering retributive value, the Panetti Court began with the
premise that “capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to
make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime . . . .”123 Thus,
the individual’s ability to connect the meaning of the crime with the
meaning and the purpose behind the punishment is essential to satisfying
retributive ends.124 This connection is never fully realized, however, if the
individual has no recollection of committing the crime and therefore can
only ever view the crime in the abstract.125
rationality.”).
121. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 727. These values are often included in discussions about
justifications of the death penalty, and often the discussions of these two values are intertwined with
one another. See Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973,
979 (1985) (“[E]ven though crime control may be a primary purpose of punishment, only retribution
can ultimately justify punishment.”); see also id. at 1006 (“Desert is centrally important in answering
not only the secondary question, ‘whom may we punish?’ but also the primary questions, ‘why do
we punish?’ and ‘why is it (if it is) moral or just or right for us to do so?’”). However, this Note will
discuss these two values individually. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
122. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
123. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958.
124. See Gale, supra note 121, at 1005 (“If a person’s chance of receiving punishment does not
relate to her own conduct, she has no incentive to forego the possibility of any perceived gain that
might accrue from breaking the criminal laws.”); see also Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in
Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 979–80 (2000) (“Consider . . . a case in which a person
engages in immoral conduct that he believes to be criminal. He subsequently discovers, much to his
surprise and relief, that his conduct was not proscribed by an existing criminal statute after all. In
such a case, one might think that the weight to be given to the principle of legality might be
insufficient to override the value of realizing retributive justice.”).
125. See O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1256–57 (2011)
(“Modifying memory neurobiologically seriously complicates [the goal of retributive justice] by
preventing access to accurate accounts of the crime, or by preventing authentic emotions (felt in the
appropriate degree) integral to appraising culpability, such as . . . empathy . . . .”); see also Birch,
supra note 86, at 27 (“What we value about a contrite individual is not merely her regret at having
committed the offense but her regret about the type of person she was and the life she led prior to
committing the offense. Radical memory loss deprives individuals of the internal mental knowledge
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In understanding the connection between an offender’s crime and the
community’s judgment of capital punishment, the offender’s ability to retain
episodic memory of the crime is essential.126 Episodic memory is the faculty
that allows individuals to remember events in sequence as if they are
reliving the experience in real time.127 Retaining an emotional memory of
the crime, which is distinct from episodic memory, is also crucial.128 To
illustrate the relevance and intersection of episodic and emotional memory
in the context of crime and punishment, one scholar proposed various
hypothetical situations where an offender’s memory is manipulated.129
Case 1 involves a defendant who robs a convenience store, kills the
store clerk, and is later sentenced to death.130 The defendant is able to reflect
on his own unfortunate upbringing as well as his actions’ effect on the
victim’s family and community.131 Consequently, the defendant is able to
construct—and the jury is able to appreciate—his mitigation case out of
genuine sorrow and remorse.132 In Case 2, however, the defendant commits
the same crime but is later affected by “anterograde amnesia,” which wipes
out his memory of the crime, and therefore he “finds it difficult to reflect on
the details of the crime to generate a sense of empathy in himself for the
victim, and, by extension, remorse.”133 Finally, in Case 3 the defendant
commits a crime under the influence of a drug that allows him to remember
the facts of the crime but blocks out any memories of shame or pain, which

of those aspects of their past that form the background and prelude to their criminal acts.”).
126. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1205 (“[Episodic memory] is arguably the richest form of
memory and is certainly most directly relevant to the relationship between memory and
punishment.”).
127. See MICHAEL E. HASSELMO, HOW WE REMEMBER: BRAIN MECHANISMS OF EPISODIC
MEMORY 1 (2013) (“Like the snow under my feet, my episodic memory retained mental footprints
showing where I faced, where I turned, and even how fast I moved.”).
128. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1218 (discussing a study that revealed that emotional memories
“exist in a seamlessly integrated fashion with [episodic] memories, adding affective content that
deeply influences how such [episodic] memories are understood and experienced”).
129. Id. at 1251–54. The author describes the interplay between episodic and emotional memory
as remembering “fitly and truly.” Id. at 1246. Remembering “fitly” requires that a memory “be
animated by a morally appropriate sentiment” and given an appropriate weight, while remembering
“truly” requires recalling the facts and events as they occurred. Id.
130. Id. at 1251.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1252.
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leaves his claim for mitigation without “a truly felt element of regret.”134
Case 1 poses no threat to achieving retributive justice because the
defendant maintained full mental capacity throughout the execution of his
crime and implementation of his punishment, recognized the mental state he
was in that led him to committing his crime, and was, therefore, able to take
full advantage of all the litigation tactics that due process afforded him.135
Case 2, however, raises more complex questions about the defendant’s
“personal identity” when he committed the crime and the defendant’s
identity when he is later punished for it.136 In Case 3, the defendant
remembers the crime “truly” but not “fitly” and thus, his lack of emotional
connection between the crime he committed and the punishment that the
community seeks detracts from the punishment’s retributive value.137
As these cases demonstrate, the reason that a lack of “episodic” or
“emotional” memory presents a challenge to the punishment’s retributive
value is that these memories make people who they are.138 When an
individual loses his memory of an important event, his consciousness is
disrupted and his identity is inherently changed.139 This is because a

134. Id.
135. Id. at 1254. Retribution focuses on who is punished for crimes because it “forbids
punishment of those individuals who have done no wrong.” Id. Because the defendant in Case 1
does not undergo an appreciable change in mental state between the crime and the punishment, there
is no question that the person who committed the crime is the “same” as the person who is punished
for it. Id.
136. Id. at 1246, 1254–55 (arguing that the defendant’s ability to remember “truly” is inhibited,
and thus the “psychological continuity” between the person who committed the crime and the person
being punished is challenged).
137. Id. at 1246, 1255 (“Without such a fitting memory, the defendant is unable to grasp fully the
horror of his own acts. This poses an obstacle to empathy, and thus remorse. This complicates the
task of punishing in a way that tracks culpability.”).
138. See Birch, supra note 86, at 18 (describing existence as nothing more than “a chain of mental
experiences” and a “sequence of mental states” that extends backward). This is known as the
“reductive theory of mind,” which “claims that the existence of a person is merely a conventional
way of identifying [the] patterns of human mental experience” that each human refers to as his
“self.” Id. Thus, when a person forgets some of those experiences or previous mental states, the
whole “notion of [the] person” is compromised. Id. at 18–19.
139. See Birch, supra note 86, at 18–19. Birch describes psychological experiments that involved
severing the connection between the left and right hemispheres of epileptic patients’ brains. Id. at
19. This separation created “two separate spheres of consciousness, in effect two minds within the
one brain,” such that the patients could no longer perform tasks that involved both hemispheres
working together. Id. This experiment begs the question: if the experiment created a division of
consciousness, “[w]hat happened to the personal identity of the patient that existed prior to the
operation?” Id.
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person’s identity, at its core, is composed of the different memories and
thoughts a person has, and the continuing “psychological connectedness” of
those thoughts and ideas.140 Thus, a loss of memory leads to psychological
discontinuity, and therefore, a change in identity.141 Retribution is rooted in
a particular individual receiving a punishment that he or she deserves for
committing a wrong.142 Therefore, the punishment’s retributive value
disappears when a defendant suffers from memory loss because the person
who the government punishes no longer has the same identity as the person
who committed the crime.143
The case law surrounding capital punishment emphasizes the
importance of exacting punishment only on the person who committed the
crime and, in the past, justified the central reason for identifying capital
punishment as “cruel and unusual” in certain contexts.144 In Enmund, for
example, the Court refused to consider the culpability of an individual who
committed felony murder when determining whether or not an individual
who simply assisted in the felony should be sentenced to death.145 Similarly,
in determining that the execution of offenders under eighteen years of age
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Roper Court focused on the changing

140. See Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 399 (1990)
(describing the view that “a person’s continued existence over time consists of two general relations,
psychological connectedness and psychological continuity”). Psychological connectedness requires
connections between a person’s memory at one time and another. Id. “For example, today I
remember the lilacs on a walk yesterday. A direct psychological connection exists between this
experience and my present memory of it. . . . To be the same person today and yesterday, there must
be enough direct connections.” Id.
141. See 1 JOHN LOCKE, Of Identity and Diversity, in AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 439, 449 (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., 1959) (1689) (“[A]s far as [a particular]
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of
that person.”).
142. See Gale, supra note 121, at 999 (“Retribution focuses not on improvement of society but
rather on just treatment of the individual.”).
143. See Birch, supra note 86, at 20 (“If our concept of a person is a construction by which we
bundle and label certain human experiences, but does not describe any additional or deep fact
beyond those experiences, then we appear to lose any good reason for suggesting why this bundle of
experiences here and now deserves to suffer punishment for something done by another bundle of
experiences at a previous time.”).
144. See infra notes 145–148 and accompanying text.
145. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus
his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike
and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the Kerseys. This was impermissible
under the Eighth Amendment.”).
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identity of young adults and its effect on their moral culpability.146 It
emphasized that even the most heinous crimes, when committed by juveniles
whose characters and identities are subject to change, may not be justified
under the Eighth Amendment.147 These cases demonstrate that the
consistency of the offender’s identity is an essential factor in determining the
retributive value of capital punishment, and thus, when an offender’s
identity is shifted via memory loss, the retributive value of such an execution
is greatly diminished.148
Once the consistency of an offender’s identity is called into question,
the retributive justification for the death penalty begins to unravel because
retribution occurs when a balance is struck between the offender and the
injured party.149 While an offender who does not remember committing a
crime might be able, as the Madison Court recognized, to “rationally”
understand the crime in the same way he might understand the events of the
Civil War, he will likely never be able to connect his own identity to those
acts.150 Thus, the offender will not “recognize at last the gravity of his
crime[s],” and society must then cope with another unjustified killing and an
unfulfilled desire for retribution.151
146. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 835 (1988)) (explaining that a difference between juveniles and adults “is that the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult,” and therefore “their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult”).
147. Id. at 570 (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less
supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of
irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character
deficiencies will be reformed.”).
148. See supra notes 138–147 and accompanying text; see also Birch, supra note 86, at 27 (“By
virtue of my character, personality, knowledge, dispositions, and memories of my life generally, I
could have maintained a high level of qualitative connection with my earlier self at the time I
committed an offense. Yet, if our intuitions are to be trusted, I ought not to deserve punishment for
wrongs committed during the period of my life that I cannot now remember.”).
149. See John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 101 (1999)
(discussing retribution as an essential element of society that evenly distributes advantages and
disadvantages within a society and viewing “punishment as retributive in aim by having the
restoration of equality as its point: equality between the wrongdoer and the law-abiding”).
150. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 727 (2019); Snead, supra note 125, at 1228–29
(explaining the possibility that a person who has forgotten parts of his life might be able to recall
“autobiographical information” but be unable to maintain his self-identity, which is “defined (and
disrupted) by the limits of his memory”).
151. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007); see also Dresser, supra note 140, at
429 (“For desert-based punishment to be morally defensible, reductionism demands that the person
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B. Moral Value: Balancing Crime and Punishment
The second tenet that the Court has considered when evaluating whether
a class of defendants are competent to be executed is the moral value of that
execution—whether it “offends humanity” to subject that group to capital
punishment.152 Scholars have struggled to define the role for morality in
capital punishment in general: some believe that death as a penalty for crime
is morally sound in extremely limited circumstances,153 while other scholars
have surmised that punishment is not grounded in morality at all.154
However, many seem to agree that the morality of punishment depends on
the proportionality between the crime committed and the punishment society
bestows.155 As the Supreme Court has recognized, ensuring proportionality
requires an individualized sentence for each defendant who commits a crime
because of “[t]he nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms
with respect to an executed capital sentence.”156 In other words, the morality
of punishment is grounded not only in the balance between the crime and the
punished be psychologically related enough to the person who chose to violate the law.”).
152. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958.
153. See Orvill C. Snyder, Capital Punishment: The Moral Issue, 63 W. VA. L. REV. 99, 116
(1961) (“[P]unishment of human beings by human beings cannot be morally justified on the ground
of retribution; it can be morally justified only on the ground of the community’s moral-law right of
self-defense.”).
154. See Finnis, supra note 149, at 92 (“Punishment itself, [Nietzsche] says, does not normally
induce a sense of guilt or bad conscience. . . . Rather, it originated in notions of equivalence
modelled on barter and sale. The criminal was debtor and the damaged creditor received
compensation . . . .”).
155. See Dresser, supra note 140, at 420 (“By committing a crime, a person commits a wrong
against society. Society is then justified in inflicting a proportionate amount of suffering on that
person.”); Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 119 (2008) (“Punitive damages, to be
morally justified and to conform to due process, must be limited and proportional to the wrong being
punished.”); Snead, supra note 125, at 1251 (“In short, retributive justice requires that the
punishment track culpability in a proportionate measure.”); Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking
Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment: How the Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders
and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 423, 458 (2009) (“[S]omething in me recoils at the
notion that the Constitution would permit death sentences for those not deserving death merely
because the sentence served some utilitarian end.”).
156. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); see also Louis D. Bilionis, Moral
Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
283, 286 (1991) (“Execution, the harshest punishment acceptable to our society, is legitimate only
when it can be said with confidence that it is not only a permissible legal response but also the
morally appropriate response to the particular crime and the particular offender.”) (emphasis
omitted).
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punishment, but also in the consistency between the person who committed
the crime and the person being punished.157
Because the morality of punishment depends on particularized
proportionality assessments for various crimes, and because the Eighth
Amendment’s meaning changes with “evolving standards of decency,”158 the
Supreme Court has used a case-by-case approach to ascertain whether
society deems execution of certain types of prisoners as cruel and unusual.159
The Court historically looks to state laws and other objective indicia of
contemporary moral values in making this determination.160 The Madison
Court, however, did not consider such evidence to gauge society’s judgment
concerning the moral appropriateness of executing offenders who have no
memory of the crime they committed.161 Instead, the Court simply
concluded that while it “offends humanity” to execute prisoners whose
mental illness prevents them from understanding the purpose of their
punishment, the “offense to morality must be much less when a person’s
mental disorder causes nothing more than an episodic memory loss.”162
Nowhere in the opinion did the Court consider whether society agrees that
this is a lesser moral offense.163
157. See Jennifer Leto, Extraordinary and Compelling: Madison v. Alabama and the Issue of
Prison Reform for Elderly Prisoners, 10 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41, 57 (2019) (“It is
important to keep in mind that just as much as the punishment must fit the crime, the punishment
should also fit the person.”).
158. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). But see Wilkins, supra note 155, at 459–83
(critiquing the “evolving standards” test for its failure to properly serve the proportionality
requirement, and instead advocating a categorical approach to Eighth Amendment limitations on
capital punishment).
159. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 417–18 (2008) (noting that while the Court
had already decided capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman was unconstitutional, “it left
open the question” of whether “other nonhomicide crimes can be punished by death consistent with
the Eighth Amendment”).
160. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597 (1977)) (“[O]ur own judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 789–94 (1982) (“Society’s rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony
murders is . . . indicated by the sentencing decisions that juries have made [and by legislative
judgments].”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 (“[W]e seek guidance in history and from the objective
evidence of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for
rape of an adult woman.”).
161. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 722–31 (2019) (limiting the analysis to a review of
standards put forth in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman).
162. Id. at 727.
163. See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text.
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One possible explanation for the Court’s decision to forgo such analysis
is that objective indicia of states’ judgments concerning execution of
amnesiac prisoners simply does not exist—either because states have not
explicitly addressed the issue, or because states that have addressed it have
contradicted one another.164 Another possibility is that the Court believed
inquiry into objective factors was unnecessary, because the issue in this case
only called for an interpretation of a standard already established under Ford
and Panetti.165 In any event, the Court was free to ignore state legislative
judgments on the matter because the Court has discretion to disagree with
those judgments if they conflict with the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment.166
Philosophers have consistently wrestled with the moral implications of
punishing those who do not remember their crimes.167 Much like the effect
that memory loss has on the retributive value of punishment, a lack of
memory about the details of a crime may affect the severity of the
punishment in the eyes of the public.168 Likewise, a penalty of death will
feel disproportionate to an offender who does not remember his own actions
and mental state at the time he committed the crime, even if he understands
the factual details of the crime he once committed.169 If a defendant does not
164. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999, 1000 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1980)) (explaining that “[s]tate sentencing
schemes may embody different penological assumptions, making interstate comparison of sentences
a difficult and imperfect enterprise,” but “proportionality review by federal courts should be
informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent’”).
165. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017) (declining to analyze objective indicia of
societal norms concerning capital sentences for inmates with low IQ scores where the Court’s
precedent clearly indicated that capital punishment in that context was unconstitutional).
166. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (“Whether the death penalty is
disproportionate to the crime committed depends as well upon the standards elaborated by
controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002)
(“[W]e shall first review the judgment of legislatures that have addressed the suitability of imposing
the death penalty on the mentally retarded and then consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with
their judgment.”).
167. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 141, at 463–64 (“But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all
hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he
knows nothing of . . . .”).
168. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1263 (“Without such memory, the punishment will seem either
too harsh or too lenient and will not resonate with the moral sensibilities of the polity.”).
169. Birch, supra note 86, at 29 (“If one tries to envisage oneself spending years in prison for
having committed some crime that one is now unable to recall and where one has no internal
knowledge or memory of one’s motivations, reasons, character or life at the time, it is difficult to
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remember the thoughts and feelings he was experiencing when he
committed the crime, he likely does not associate the crime with his own
identity.170
Consequently, putting a defendant to death who feels
disassociated from his crime in this way offends humanity for many of the
same reasons that the Court reached such a conclusion in Ford and
Panetti.171
The Court also emphasized the importance of a defendant’s self-identity
in Enmund and Roper, where it discussed the moral implications of
executing a defendant whose identity is disconnected from the crime.172 In
Enmund, the Court stated that the defendant’s moral guilt is essential to his
criminal culpability, and capital punishment would be unconstitutionally
excessive in the absence of such guilt.173 Even if the defendant’s accomplice
in the crime had possessed the intent to kill, the defendant’s “punishment
must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt,” and
therefore, sentencing him to death as punishment for a crime he did not
intend would have been disproportionate to his moral guilt.174 This
reasoning applies to Madison because his loss of memory and consequential
change in identity lessened his personal responsibility and moral guilt.175
believe that one could acknowledge the punishment as deserved.”).
170. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1241 (“[B]y sustaining personal identity, memory makes it
possible for others to fully hold us to account for our moral obligations.”).
171. See Leto, supra note 157, at 57 (“It is important to make sure that the identity of the offender
and the identity of the inmate up for execution are the same. Madison is no longer the same man
who committed his heinous crime.”); supra text accompanying note 162. In Panetti v. Quarterman,
the Court emphasized the difference between an “awareness of the State’s rationale for an
execution” and “a rational understanding of it.” 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007). The Court concluded
that a defendant should not be executed if he cannot comprehend “the meaning and purpose of the
punishment to which he has been sentenced.” Id. at 960. A defendant who cannot remember his
crime has no psychological connection to his criminal acts, and therefore his understanding of the
“meaning and purpose” of punishment will not be the same as a defendant who remembers his
crime. See Dresser, supra note 140, at 413, 421–22. Thus, a lack of memory calls this essential
prerequisite for punishment into question. Id. at 413 (“The weaker the psychological connection, the
less punishment is deserved . . . .”).
172. See infra notes 173–180 and accompanying text.
173. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698
(1975)).
174. Id. at 801 (“Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had
no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of
ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”).
175. Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2019); see also Derek Parfit, On “The Importance
of Self-Identity”, 68 J. PHIL. 683, 686 (1971) (“[A] person’s life can be divided into the lives of
successive selves. This can be done where there is a marked change in character, or some other
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Thus, Madison’s sentence does not reflect his own criminal culpability, and
like in Enmund, the proportionality between his crime and his punishment is
necessarily called into question.176
In Roper, the Court similarly emphasized that “[c]apital punishment
must be limited to those offenders . . . whose extreme culpability makes
them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”177 The Court concluded that
juveniles are unlikely to fall within this class of the worst-behaved
individuals because their characters “[are] not as well formed as [those] of
. . . adult[s],” and their personality traits are “more transitory.”178 Just as
juveniles’ identities are fragile and leave open the possibility for reformation
of immorality, a defendant who forgets his former criminal behavior is
presented with an opportunity to ameliorate his character.179 Thus,
extending the reasoning of Roper to Madison might have led to a different
result, as there remained hope that Madison’s identity might be changed and
his morality retrieved.180
Another challenge to proportionality arises from the argument that
dementia may itself be its own punishment, and therefore adding death as a

lessening in psychological connectedness.”).
176. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002)).
178. Id. at 570 (“From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor
with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.”).
179. Dresser, supra note 140, at 446 (“Reductionism invites serious dialogue about what
psychological connectedness and continuity qualify as a morally defensible basis for retributive,
deterrent, and incapacitative punishment. It urges consideration as to what sorts of rehabilitative
programs might be effective [for defendants who are psychologically disconnected from their
crimes].”).
180. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 573 (“An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or
cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth
as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and
lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.”). This holds true in
Madison’s case, where the facts of his past crime might interfere with a faithful application of the
competency standard. See, e.g., Kelsey Stein, Who is Vernon Madison? Alabama Cop-Killer Facing
Execution Has Claimed Insanity, Incompetence, AL.COM (JAN. 13, 2019), https://www.al.
com/news/2016/05/who_is_vernon_madison_alabama.html (quoting Judge McRae, who described
Madison as “a man whose life history is but one sequel after another of violent, assaultive acts
against other human beings and total disregard for our laws” when sentencing Madison to death).
Judge McRae sentenced Madison to death despite the jury’s recommendation of life without parole.
Id. Judge McRae has overridden “six jury recommendations for life without parole to impose a
death sentence, the most of any judge in Alabama.” Id.
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penalty tips the scales of crime and punishment out of balance.181 The Ford
Court briefly raised this issue, but Panetti offered no insight as to its
validity; therefore, the Madison Court did not address it when deciding the
constitutionality of executing a defendant with vascular dementia.182
However, scholars have since pondered over the effect that such mental
illness has on punishments—particularly when a prisoner’s living conditions
contribute to the illness.183 Prison conditions are understandably harsh, but
there is also an absence of corrective treatment when those conditions lead
to cognitive decline.184 While this argument may apply with less force when
the punishment the defendant suffered is memory loss rather than a loss of
all cognitive sense, it is nevertheless certain that: 1) the argument of
cognitive decline as sufficient punishment was considered in Ford,185 and
2) prison conditions do contribute to cognitive decline.186 Therefore,
because mental decline adds an additional layer of punishment onto a prison
sentence, courts should at least address a defendant’s enduring cognitive
decline—in any form—when weighing the severity of a crime against the

181. Cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (“It is also said that execution serves no
purpose in these cases because madness is its own punishment . . . .”).
182. See id. See generally Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 722–31 (2019) (lacking any
reference to insanity being a punishment on its own); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934–62
(2007) (acknowledging that Ford brought up the point as a factor but neglecting to expound on it).
183. See, e.g., Patrick A. Dawson & J. David Putnal, Ford v. Wainwright: Eighth Amendment
Prohibits Execution of the Insane, 38 MERCER L. REV. 949, 968 (1987) (discussing collateral issues
raised by Ford, such as “how [the state will deal] with prison conditions that may be fostering poor
mental health among inmates”). Similarly, the status of “death row inmate” often causes
psychological torment and mental decline. See Douglas Mossman, Assessing and Restoring
Competency to be Executed: Should Psychiatrists Participate?, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 397, 398 (1987)
(discussing how the “extreme physical and emotional stress” capital inmates experience from sitting
on death row often causes psychosis in prisoners); Quinn Carlson, Madison v. Alabama: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Ford, 97 DENV. L. REV. 597, 616–17 (2020).
184. James R. P. Ogloff et. al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clinical, and
Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 125, 134 (1994) (noting that correctional facilities
have failed to effectively respond to mentally ill prisoners’ treatment needs, and discussing the “high
prevalence of [mentally ill offenders] in jails and prisons of the United States,” who “face significant
hurdles as they endure the routine challenges of dealing with mental illness while in prison” and are
“more likely to be victimized by other offenders”).
185. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
186. See Ruthanne DeWolfe & Alan S. DeWolfe, Impact of Prison Conditions on the Mental
Health of Inmates, 4 S. ILL. U. L.J. 497, 501 (1979) (“Courts have gradually recognized that there is
some relationship between prison conditions, emotional and mental states, and destructive
behavior.”).

525

[Vol. 48: 497, 2021]

Blurred Lines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

severity of the punishment.187
As the Ford Court acknowledged, scholars have long believed that
humanity demands an execution be stayed if a defendant becomes of
“nonsane memory.”188 Contextually, the word “memory” may have been
intended to refer to the mind generally rather than its modern understanding
as the ability to store information,189 but the connection between memory
and the mind’s other faculties makes the sentiment applicable to memory
loss as well.190 The Eighth Amendment has at its core a “basic concept of
human dignity,” and it demands that capital punishment be reserved for
defendants with the most extreme culpability because execution is “unique
in its severity and irrevocability.”191 A defendant who has lost his memory
of the crime has lessened culpability because his psychological connection
to the criminal act is diminished, and he can therefore only ever understand
the crime and his punishment in the abstract.192 Thus, the moral principles
of the Eighth Amendment cannot support a sentence of death for a defendant
who has no memory of the crime he committed.193
Madison’s holding fails to address how the change in identity caused by
187. See Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 13 (2017) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]e may well have
to consider the ways in which lengthy periods of imprisonment between death sentence and
execution can deepen the cruelty of the death penalty while at the same time undermining its
penological rationale.”); see also Bilionis, supra note 156, at 328 (“Nowhere is it written that a state
has a right to be unwary of the Constitution’s demands, particularly when the state seeks to take the
life of one of its citizens.”).
188. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406–07 (1986) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *24–25).
189. Jack C. Schoenholtz et al., The “Legal” Abuse of Physicians in Deaths in the United States:
The Erosion of Ethics and Morality in Medicine, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1505, 1596 (1996) (quoting
Memory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990)) (alteration in original) (“[T]he word
[‘memory’] as used in Blackstone and other ancient authorities, appeared to be synonymous with
‘mind’, [sic] whereas the word ‘memory’, [sic] in modern times is used in a more restricted sense of
recollection of past events rather than the general state of one’s mental power.”).
190. Id. at 1594–98 (discussing the interconnectedness between memory and the mind).
191. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–87 (1976) (first citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion); then citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–91 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); and then citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
192. See Parfit, supra note 175, at 687 (“When we think about an earlier part of our lives, we can
reflect upon the weakening, over time, in psychological connectedness. Such reflections may
produce in us a kind of detachment. We can then say, ‘That was only my past self.’”).
193. Brief for Petitioner at 27, Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019) (No. 17-7505) (“For
purposes of retribution, there is no moral or constitutional distinction between a person who cannot
‘recogni[ze] . . . the severity of the offense’ as a result of delusions and a person who is unable to do
so as a result of dementia, cognitive decline, and memory deficits.”).
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memory loss in turn affects a defendant’s rational understanding of his
crime.194 Consequently, this oversight poses a threat to Eighth Amendment
protections because the execution of a defendant who does not remember
committing the crime cannot be justified by either retributive values195 or
moral arguments of proportionality.196
V. LOOKING FORWARD: HOW WILL MADISON AFFECT COMPETENCY
DETERMINATIONS?
The Madison Court applied the competency standard developed under
Panetti to reach its conclusion, emphasizing that Panetti focused on
cognitive inability—specifically, inability to rationally understand a state’s
reason for execution—rather than which mental conditions may cause that
inability.197 The Court in Madison held that “simpl[e] forgetful[ness]” alone
is insufficient to render a defendant incompetent, but it also acknowledged
that forgetfulness might be enough if it causes a lack of rational
understanding of the death sentence.198 But, as the Panetti Court recognized,
“a concept like rational understanding is difficult to define.”199 Madison’s
proposition—that a defendant can rationally understand the connection
between his crime and the punishment imposed even when the defendant has

194. See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 726–27 (explaining the Court’s reasoning without examination of
the identity question described).
195. See supra Section IV.A.
196. See supra Section IV.B.
197. Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 728 (“[Panetti’s] standard focuses on whether a mental disorder has
had a particular effect: an inability to rationally understand why the State is seeking execution.”).
198. Id. at 727–29. The Court provided examples for when dementia may be sufficient to cause a
lack of rational understanding, such as “when a person has difficulty preserving any memories, so
that even newly gained knowledge (about, say, the crime and punishment) will be quickly forgotten.
Or . . . when cognitive deficits prevent the acquisition of such knowledge at all, so that memory gaps
go forever uncompensated.” Id. at 728.
199. Panetti v. Quartman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007). The Court then noted that the “lack of
rational understanding” standard is not satisfied when any defendant is “so callous as to be
unrepentant; so self-centered and devoid of compassion as to lack all sense of guilt; so adept in
transferring blame to others as to be considered, at least in the colloquial sense, to be out of touch
with reality.” Id. at 960. Rather, a “severe, documented mental illness” will mark “[t]he beginning
of doubt about competence in a case.” Id.; see also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence,
Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2006)
(“Though it is well established that, to be competent, a criminal defendant must have a ‘rational’ as
well as ‘factual’ understanding of her situation, the meaning of such ‘rational understanding’ has
gone largely undefined.”).
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no memory of committing the crime—makes the term even more elusive,
and it is likely that courts will have difficulty applying Madison’s holding.200
Although Madison attempted to simplify Panetti’s solution to
determining competency to be executed, scholars have often criticized
Panetti’s vague use of the term “rational understanding” because it has
allowed courts to virtually ignore the requirement altogether, so long as a
capital defendant is aware of the State’s reason for execution.201 Some
scholars propose a categorical ban of execution in all cases involving
mentally ill defendants.202 However, the primary objection to Panetti’s
elusive standard is its failure to offer any real solution for how to proceed
when the psychological complexity of mental illness, the philosophical
complexity and importance of capital punishment, and the difficulty of
defining “rational understanding” intersect, despite the opinion’s
acknowledgment of these issues.203
After Madison, the competency determination has become even more
complicated; now, psychological experts must distinguish between
defendants with memory loss who can “rationally” conceptualize the
connection between a crime they committed and the State’s death sentence
from those who cannot.204 It is true that some ethical dilemmas may be more
200. Cf. Steiker, supra note 14, at 290 (discussing the “tensions and uncertainties” that the Panetti
standard creates and arguing that it raises “global questions about the proper scope of Eighth
Amendment constraints on punishment and the methodology for determining that scope”).
201. See Blume, supra note 11, at 341 (footnote omitted) (“Some courts have interpreted Panetti
as imposing an additional requirement of a rational understanding of death and the reasons for
execution in determining competency to be executed, but for the most part, courts have held that
Panetti only reiterated Ford’s requirements.”).
202. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 155, at 476–79 (describing a categorical ban on capital
punishment for prisoners with psychotic disorders). Of course, there are also scholars who have
suggested the possibility of a categorical approach in the other direction, in opposition to the
holdings of Ford and Panetti. See Steiker, supra note 14, at 296 (“What if a different Supreme
Court were to conclude that the rationale of Ford was simply wrong, that there are good reasons to
execute those who have become incompetent while awaiting execution (reasons that might flow
from incapacitation, deterrence, or retribution of some sort or another)?”).
203. Michael Mello, Executing the Mentally Ill—When Is Someone Sane Enough to Die?, 22
CRIM. JUST. 30, 31 (2007) (“If the mentally ill shouldn’t be put to death, what is the correct standard
for measuring execution competency; what kinds of mental illness ‘count’? Who should set that
standard? Who—employing what procedural vehicles—should decide whether a particular prisoner
is sane enough to die? . . . The problem of the intersection between mental illness and capital
punishment isn’t rocket science. It’s much harder than that.”).
204. Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2019) (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962)
(emphasizing that “neurologists, psychologists, and other experts can contribute to a court’s
understanding” of issues involving mental competency and rational understanding).
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easily avoided when a defendant’s competency evaluation concerns loss of
memory rather than psychotic delusions, such as his ability to consent to the
evaluation.205
However, other issues at the heart of the rational
understanding requirement become significantly more difficult to
evaluate.206 One scholar, for example, argues that a defendant’s emotional
appreciation of a criminal act and its consequences are essential for rational
understanding.207 As previously discussed, emotional appreciation of these
concepts is called into question when a defendant has lost his memory of the
crime because the defendant no longer psychologically identifies with the
person he was when he committed the crime.208
Madison itself reflects the obstacles its opinion creates through its
reasoning for remanding the case back to state court to determine whether
Madison is currently competent to be executed.209 The Court acknowledged
that the state court’s original ruling in 2016 stated the correct standard—that
Madison had a rational understanding under Panetti—but it worried that the
state court reached this determination by simply concluding that Madison
was not delusional.210 It directed the state court to reassess whether
Madison’s dementia prevents him from rationally understanding why he is
to be executed, assuring that the state court could “evaluate such matters
better.”211 While the Court suggested earlier in its opinion that dementia
may cause incompetency where newly gained information is “quickly
forgotten” or where “memory gaps go forever uncompensated,”212 it failed to
expand upon what kind of memory retention is necessary for a defendant to
satisfy the rational understanding requirement.213
What if a defendant retains only a semantic memory of the crime, such
205. Mark A. Small & Randy K. Otto, Evaluations of Competency to Be Executed: Legal
Contours and Implications for Assessment, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 146, 152 (1991) (“[I]t may be
that the difficulties which led someone to question the prisoner’s competency to be executed may
also compromise his competency to consent to the psychological evaluation.”).
206. See infra notes 207–208 and accompanying text.
207. Maroney, supra note 199, at 1405–06.
208. Dresser, supra note 135140, at 426 (“The person punished must be psychologically related to
the offender, and must continue to have enough of the culpable mental state to justify attribution of
responsibility and the infliction of punishment.”).
209. See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 729–31.
210. Id. at 730.
211. Id. at 731.
212. See id. at 727–28 (discussing how memory loss affects a Panetti analysis).
213. Id. at 731 (stating that the Court “express[es] no view” on whether the defendant reached a
“rational understanding”).
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that he can remember factually that he committed a crime when shown
pictures of the scene or of the weapon he used, but cannot remember the
experience of committing the crime?214 What if a defendant’s memory is
damaged such that he can only remember information for a week at a time—
is this what the Court considers to be information that is “quickly
forgotten?”215 Madison left the resolution of these difficult issues largely in
the hands of experts before the lower courts and the findings they choose to
emphasize, which raises ethical concerns for psychiatrists as to the extent of
their participation in execution proceedings.216 It is also likely that lower
courts may avoid addressing these issues involving the relationship between
memory and rational understanding altogether, as they have avoided
undergoing a general rational understanding analysis up to this point by
simply adopting the psychological findings and interpretations of either
party’s expert.217
Rather than further complicate the competency standard by asking
214. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1207–08 (describing a patient whose semantic memory was
intact and who could remember his address and the location of his parents’ vacation home, but
whose damaged episodic memory prevented him from remembering any experiences of his own
life).
215. See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 728 (neglecting to define “quickly forgotten”); see also Snead,
supra note 125, at 1226 (footnote omitted) (“Memory—including the activities of encoding,
remembering, and forgetting—is indispensable to the essential and distinctive activities of human
life . . . .”).
216. See Loren H. Roth, The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY. 411, 412
(1987) (“There is uncertainty about whether it is ethical for psychiatrists to participate in death row
evaluations . . . . After much discussion, the council was unable to agree, on the basis of principle,
whether psychiatric participation in the evaluation and treatment of persons sentenced to execution is
consistent with ethical standards.”). But see Douglas Mossman, supra note 183, at 407
(“Psychiatrists . . . need not feel that pragmatic solutions to fulfilling the tasks assigned to them by
execution competency statutes will necessarily involve compromising professional standards.”).
While professional psychological evaluations are necessary in order to determine competency
to be executed, the problem seems to be that courts have come to rely too heavily on these
evaluations, and have abandoned their independent duty to apply legal standards to the psychological
findings. See Melissa L. Cox & Patricia A. Zapf, An Investigation of Discrepancies Between Mental
Health Professionals and the Courts in Decisions About Competency, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
109, 131 (2004) (proposing greater education for judges on the interplay between psychology and
legal competency standards).
217. See supra note 216 and accompanying text; see also Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458,
496–97 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (adopting the opinions of the respondent’s expert that the petitioner’s
belief that the prosecutor and the sentencing court were conspiring against him was “simply a means
of ‘rationalizing’ [his] current situation[]”), aff’d, 619 F. App’x. 304 (5th Cir. 2015). This is
particularly likely in light of the fact that Madison failed to provide a concrete standard for
evaluating memory’s effect on rational understanding. See Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 731.
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psychiatrists and other experts to determine whether a defendant who has no
memory of his crime can still have a rational understanding of the
connection between the crime and punishment, the Court should have
adopted a categorical prohibition of capital punishment for defendants who
cannot remember their crimes.218 In University of Detroit Professor Pamela
Wilkins’s assessment of current Eighth Amendment and capital punishment
jurisprudence, she recognizes a “double bind” that makes it difficult for the
Court to implement categorical bans on executing certain classes of
individuals.219 Specifically, she recognizes that certain conditions that make
defendants less culpable also make defendants (at least appear) to be more
dangerous, and juries often give more weight to the future dangerousness of
defendants than to the defendant’s reduced culpability.220 While this
phenomenon might not be problematic when focusing on retributive values
of punishment in isolation, it becomes problematic when considering
whether it leads to a punishment that is greater than what the defendant
actually deserves.221
To address this bind, Wilkins proposes a new test for determining when
a categorical prohibition is appropriate for a certain class of individuals.222
The test has four conditions that must be met: 1) the class members must
have a particular condition that is not chosen by the class members or
defined by their past experiences; 2) the condition must be significantly
mitigating (meaning it substantially reduces the individual’s culpability);
3) the mitigating condition must indicate (or could be understood by a jury
to indicate) an enhanced possibility of future dangerousness; and 4) there
must be a substantial risk that the jury will weigh the possibility of future

218. See Wilkins, supra note 155, at 483 (“Contrary to what some might claim, the incoherence of
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on categorical prohibitions is not a good or sufficient reason to
eliminate such prohibitions altogether.”).
219. Id. at 426.
220. Id. at 426–27 (describing the difficulties defendants face when juries perceive them as
dangerous).
221. Id. at 430 (“A deserts-limitation view of the Eighth Amendment insists upon the primacy of
retribution: utilitarian arguments about deterrence and incapacitation must yield in the face of
deserts-based arguments.”).
222. Id. at 470. Wilkins’ test intends to counteract juries’ tendency to weigh the potential future
dangerousness of a defendant more heavily than the defendant’s reduced culpability. Id. (footnote
omitted) (“[I]s there a substantial risk that when the characteristics of a condition point
simultaneously to significantly reduced culpability and to future dangerousness, the jury will give
more weight to the future dangerousness issue than to the moral deserts issue?”).
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dangerousness more heavily than the defendant’s reduced culpability.223 If
all of these conditions are met, then a categorical exclusion is appropriate.224
Applying this test to Madison’s case, a categorical prohibition on
executing defendants who cannot remember their crime should be
implemented because these defendants have significantly reduced
culpability,225 yet juries could interpret their memory loss as enhancing the
possibility of their future dangerousness.226 The risk that juries might give
more weight to the potential for future dangerousness than to the defendant’s
lessened culpability is substantiated by Madison’s case itself.227 The Court
should therefore implement a categorical ban to protect defendants who
completely lose memory of their crime, to prevent courts—and juries—from
levying the ultimate punishment against defendants who do not deserve it.228
As the Justices recognized during oral argument in Madison, some
commentators argue that allowing memory loss to prevent execution would
cause a substantial increase in defendants who falsely claim that they cannot
223. Id. at 470–71.
224. See id. at 471. As Wilkins notes, this test for categorical bans is more constitutionally sound
than having no categorical bans because without them, the defendant bears the risk that he may be
sentenced to death due to a condition that seems dangerous, even though the condition makes him
less deserving of death. Id. at 476. While the Constitution prohibits excessive punishments, it is
ambivalent towards potential under-punishment of defendants protected by the categorical ban. Id.
225. See supra Section IV.A.
226. See Snead, supra note 125, at 1261 (explaining that because memory loss causes a disruption
in personal identity, predicting how a previously violent person will act in the future after suffering
from memory loss becomes very difficult). While a defendant whose identity is altered by memory
loss “may very well refrain from repeating prior bad acts,” id., it is easy to envision how a jury might
interpret a capital defendant’s loss of memory—as making him more unpredictable or indifferent
towards his previous crimes. See JOEL NORRIS, SERIAL KILLERS 239–40 (1989) (explaining how
memory loss and head trauma are frequently associated with “individuals who are at risk of
becoming episodically violent, even if there is no diagnosed brain malfunction”).
227. Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2019). After a competency hearing, the trial court
had found Madison competent to be executed despite his argument that he could no longer
remember his crime. Id.
228. See Wilkins, supra note 155, at 483 (concluding that the Supreme Court should shift its
currently inconsistent Eighth Amendment inquiry to a standard that focuses primarily on deserts).
In response to the outcome of Madison, Quinn Carlson similarly proposes a categorical ban on
the execution of a class of defendants that would include Madison. See Carlson, supra note 183, at
618. That proposal, however, focuses on defendants who have been “diagnosed with a mental
illness that, by definition, impairs [their] cognitive capacity.” Id. Because this Note concludes,
however, that the relationship between memory loss and self-identity is the precise trigger that
lessens a defendant’s culpability, its proposal applies to all defendants who lose memory of their
crimes, rather than defendants who are diagnosed with a mental illness that impairs cognitive
capacity. See supra notes 225–226 and accompanying text.
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remember their crimes.229 However, this outcome is unlikely for two
reasons: First, a similar fear of frivolous claims arose when Ford created a
claim for incompetency due to mental illness, but the number of inmates
who filed claims of incompetency after Ford was close to the number of
inmates found to have a severe mental illness.230 Second, true memory loss,
whether brought on by dementia or amnesia or some other mental illness, is
a measurable affliction that defendants can prove in court.231 Thus, while it
may be easy for defendants to file frivolous claims of incompetency based
on memory loss, an influx of frivolous claims seems unlikely, and any
frivolous claim filed will have a low chance of success.232
Around 2,500 prisoners are currently sitting on death row.233 In 2019,
“at least 19 of the 22 executed prisoners” suffered from either mental illness,
intellectual disability, or severe trauma.234 The use of capital punishment in
America “continue[s] to wither,”235 but for those whose execution dates
229. See supra note 99 (discussing oral argument in Madison). This fear parallels the fear felt by
many when the Court developed a standard for mental competency in the first place. See Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 435 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The defendant has already had a
full trial on the issue of guilt, and a trial on the issue of penalty; the requirement of still a third
adjudication offers an invitation to those who have nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely
spurious claims of insanity.”).
230. See Blume, supra note 11, at 353–56 (examining “the assumption of a floodgate of claims”
based on mental incompetency and finding that the number of Ford claims filed reflected the
number of inmates with severe mental illness, that those inmates who did file a Ford claim had a
relatively high success rate, and that a large percentage of Ford claimants had a history of mental
illness). The same result occurred after Atkins created a claim for incompetency due to mental
retardation, as only 7% of inmates subsequently filed Atkins claims, and 40% of those claims were
successful. See id. at 353.
231. See, e.g., Andrea Schaffner, Understanding Dementia, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 372, 375–
76 (2010) (discussing the various stages of dementia and comparing subjective complaints of
memory deficit with objective evidence of memory decline through clinical examination); see also
O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1265, 1290 (2007) (discussing the eventual use of neuroimaging in the courtroom to evaluate
memory).
232. See Blume, supra note 11, at 353–56 (“If the old adage that you can indict a ham sandwich is
true (and it is), that same ham sandwich would also almost certainly be found competent to stand
trial.”).
233. Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview
(last visited Sept. 25, 2020).
234. The Death Penalty in 2019: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 16,
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/reports/year-end/YearEndReport2019.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,
2020).
235. Id. at 2. According to this report, the use of the death penalty in 2019 remained “near
historic lows,” with the imposition of only 34 new death sentences. Id. This marks “the second-
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approach, a clarification of the rational understanding test could mean the
difference between life and death.236 The Court should revisit the
competency standard before another life is taken in vain.237
VI. CONCLUSION
Society reserves capital punishment for offenders with the highest level
of culpability, when retribution can be best accomplished with their deaths
and moral values cannot justify preserving their lives.238 When a defendant
retains no memory of the crime for which he has been sentenced at the time
of his execution, however, the defendant will never have the last minute
recognition of “the gravity of his crime[s]” that society desires when seeking
punishment.239 Similarly, a defendant who lacks the requisite level of
psychological connectedness to the crime inherently carries less culpability,
which makes execution a disproportionately severe punishment.240
Moreover, the Court’s imprecise distinction between memory loss alone and
memory loss that prevents a rational understanding of the crime makes the
phrase even more elusive and causes increasing difficulty for lower courts in

lowest number [of death sentences issued] in the modern era of capital punishment.” Id.
236. See Leto, supra note 157, at 46 (“The implications of the Madison decision will have a
lasting impact on the criminal justice system. This opinion will echo throughout prisons all over the
country.”).
237. See id. at 59 (“To kill a man, who does not remember his crime, his trial, the victim, and
maybe even himself, is a merciless killing.”).
238. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012) (“[T]he death penalty is reserved only for the
most culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses.”); see also Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007) (explaining that capital punishment is used to help the offender recognize
the wrongness of his crime and to impose the penalty society views as justified).
239. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958; see also Birch, supra note 86, at 28 (“A person who is unable to
recollect the moral attitudes and beliefs she held at the time of the offense and the decisional process
by which she came to commit it . . . is not capable of contrition or repentance.”). Professor Birch
also compares the relationship between memory of a crime and deservedness of a punishment to the
relationship between memory of a good deed and deservedness of a reward. See id. at 25. He argues
that just as people would gain less satisfaction from public praise for a good deed that they
completed but cannot remember, they would feel less regret from punishment for a crime for which
they have no recollection. Id.
240. Dresser, supra note 140, at 432 (“In at least some cases, the customary punishment for a past
offense is inappropriate because the person now lacks some or all of the psychological features
which formerly justified punishment.”); see Romero, supra note 155, at 129–30 (stating that when
evaluating the proportionality between crime and punishment, courts focus on the culpability and
mental state of the defendant rather than the harm caused).
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applying the correct competency standard.241
The Eighth Amendment was created to ensure not only that society has
a say in how criminals are treated, but also to serve as a check on society
when its penological desires overstep the limits of morality.242 In Madison,
the Court failed to address any objective indicia of whether society agrees
with capital punishment for defendants who cannot remember their
crimes.243 More importantly, however, the Court refused to consider the
intricacies of the connection between memory and psychological continuity
and how that connection affects the retributive and moral values sought
through capital punishment.244 Madison instead left us with an elusive
standard that places the ever-ambiguous “rational understanding” test at its
core.245 Unfortunately, until the Court recognizes the inseverable bond
between memory and identity, communities will continue to hand out death
sentences that leave their retributive desires unsatisfied, and defendants will
continue to die without the subjective understanding of crime and
punishment that the Eighth Amendment requires.246

Cassidy Young

241. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 18, at 158 (“According to the Alabama Attorney General . . .
Madison’s conviction was justified because he ‘understood what he was accused of and how the
state planned to punish him.’ Is that a ‘rational understanding’ of the execution?” (internal footnote
omitted)).
242. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))
(“As we have seen . . . the Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be
acceptable to contemporary society. The Court also must ask whether it comports with the basic
concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment.”).
243. See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
245. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2019) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551
U.S. 930, 958 (2007)); see also Steiker, supra note 14, at 300 (“Hard as it may be to decide what a
‘rational understanding’ of a death sentence entails, it is even harder to envision the day when it will
be clear what constitutes a ‘rational understanding’ of [the] Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.”).
246. See Dresser, supra note 140, at 446 (discussing the need for “serious dialogue about what
psychological connectedness and continuity qualify as a morally defensible basis for retributive,
deterrent, and incapacitative punishment,” and concluding that “[i]t is up to us as persons to decide”
how to incorporate our enhanced understanding of persons over time into our rules and practices).
* J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law; B.A., University of California,
Irvine. Thank you to the members of Pepperdine Law Review for your dedication and precision
throughout the editing process. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their
unwavering support and contributions to my sanity during these most trying times.
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